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1. The task at hand
This is a discussion on metaphor, language, and the existence of numbers. What 
should we believe exists?1 The Quinean response is straightforward:   
We should believe in all and only those objects over which we must quantify 
in our best scientific theories. Let us call this view Ontological Commitment 
= Quantifier Commitment, or OC=QC.2
If we accept OC=QC, then we get a straightforward argument that if 
we trust science, then we should believe in the existence of mathematical 
objects:3
OC=QC: We should believe in the existence of all and only those 
objects over which we must quantify in our best scientific theories.
IndIspensabIlIty: We must quantify over mathematical objects in our 
best scientific theories.
C1: So, we should believe that mathematical objects exist.
abstraCtness: If mathematical objects exist, then they are abstract 
objects.
platonIsm: Thus, we should believe that abstract objects (including 
numbers and other mathematical objects) exist. 
1 Note that this is a different question from ‘what exists?’ Perhaps on the planetoid 
Pluto there are cute, purple-feathered flying orange fish. If so, I take it we have no good 
reason to believe in their existence.
2 OC=QC blends two theses: (1) we should believe in the existence of those things 
that the theories we believe say exist and (2) we should believe our best scientific 
theories. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who pressed me on this point, correctly 
assessing that my target is (1), and noted that I followed cases in the literature in which 
the two claims are stated as a combined thesis. I agree. I chose to use OC=QC rather than 
(1) to sidestep exegetical questions about Azzouni’s work and to bypass questions that 
may arise when we pull them apart. For instance, we might ask what counts as a theory 
that is not also a scientific theory, and we might wonder why we “ought” to believe in the 
things of which our theories speak if they are not our best theories. Because these issues 
need not be settled for my discussion to proceed, I took the simpler path. But thanks 
again to the reviewer for the encouragement to take up this topic in a further paper.
3 This is simply a version of an indispensability argument for the existence of 
mathematical objects that cashes out “indispensability” in terms of quantifier commitment. 
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I invite you to join me in accepting IndIspensabIlIty4 and abstraCtness 
for the sake of argument. Our aim here is to seek good reasons to deem 
OC=QC untenable and to thereby disrupt the justification for platonIsm. 
Our method is exploratory: We consider how work by Jody Azzouni on 
quantifier commitments and the powers of observation to yield thick 
epistemic access to concrete objects might complement Stephen Yablo’s work 
on hermeneutic fictionalism/figuralism with respect to number talk in the 
sciences, and vice versa. We have a negative project: to argue that OC=QC 
is misguided because we ought not read our ontological commitments off of 
our quantifier commitments. We also have a positive project: to suggest an 
alternative criterion to OC=QC that allows us to accept IndIspensabIlIty 
and abstraCtness, yet to reject C1 and so platonIsm.
To give just a taste of context on these two authors, Azzouni 
is a nominalist who not-so-controversially holds that mathematical 
objects do not exist (nor subsist), yet he is also a formalist who quite 
controversially claims that statements that quantify over mathematical 
objects can nevertheless be literally true. For, he thinks, we can have 
a coherent notion of truth that appeals to formalization alone.5 In contrast, 
I think we can fairly say that Yablo is neither nominalist nor platonist. He 
quite controversially holds instead that in at least some important cases, 
there is no fact of the matter as to whether abstract objects exist. He also 
(less controversially) holds, like many other fictionalists/figuralists, that 
statements that quantify over mathematical objects are not (or perhaps more 
weakly, are not meant to be taken as) literally true, but nevertheless that 
they remain useful as their important content is given by their metaphorical 
or figurative content.6
Despite the clear differences between the two philosophers, they both 
(largely) take IndIspensabIlIty and abstraCtness as given and locate the 
problem with the argument for platonIsm with the untenability of OC=QC. 
They concur that issues with how and why we quantify over mathematical 
objects in our best scientific theories make it the case that we ought not 
4 This is an empirical claim about science that we will take as given, though it 
faces some strong opposition. Hartry Field, for instance, offers strong arguments with 
compelling examples to show that we may well be able to eliminate talk of mathematical 
objects in science. See Colyvan (2012) for a discussion.
5  See Azzouni (2005 and 2011).
6 Yablo (2010) and Turner (2012).90 Roxanne Marie Kurtz
read our ontological commitments off of the quantifier commitments of our 
theories. In this way, the views of Azzouni and Yablo are congenial with 
respect to what we should believe exists. 
First, I briefly recount the highlights of Yablo’s argument that our 
metaphorical use of language makes equating the quantifier commitments 
of a first order theory (with all nonessential metaphors paraphrased away) 
with its ontological commitments a dubious project. Next, I put forward 
Azzouni’s picture of ontological commitment that distinguishes between 
those entities that theories quantify over because of the nature of the world, 
and those that they quantify over because of the nature of language. With 
these views on the table, I then look at how they provide mutual support 
against oC=QC and in favor of Azzouni’s notion of thick epistemic access 
as a criterion of ontological commitment. Finally, I sketch some possible 
replies from this fortified position to the philosopher who bucks at the new 
version of ontological commitment and to the mathematician who insists 
that she does have thick epistemic access to mathematical objects.
2. Yablo’s make-believe
I was trying to find a way of being unserious about theoretical entities in math   
that didn’t force me to take a similar view of theoretical entities in physics.
Stephen Yablo in a 2011 interview.7
Let us take two key points away from Yablo’s “Apriority and Existence” 
and “A Paradox of Existence.”8 First, Yablo argues that we ought to take 
statements that quantify over platonic objects like numbers figuratively: We 
ought to understand them as existential metaphors rather than commitments, 
with their value to scientific theories reducing to metaphorical truth, utility 
or aptness. Second, because of the challenges of unscrambling metaphorical 
and literal quantifiers within scientific theories, Quine’s criterion for 
ontological commitment will not work: We ought not read our ontological 
commitments off of a theory’s quantified statements when some ought to 
be taken metaphorically.
7 Bateman (2011).
8 Yablo (2000a; 2000b).91 Quinean Ontological Commitment Derailed
In broad strokes, Yablo defends his position by offering it as a solution 
to a dilemma. If we hold statements that quantify over platonic objects to be 
literally true, then existence proofs for platonic objects become immediate 
and trivial thanks to straightforward a priori bridge principles conjoined with 
uncontroversial a priori or a posteriori premises. The triviality of such proofs 
is an untenable result for the philosopher who either accepts Quine’s position 
that a successful argument for the existence of platonic objects must be an 
a posteriori, holistic effort that shows why the kind of entity in question is 
required by the best version of the theory at hand, or believes that we can 
prove the existence of platonic objects only through sophisticated a priori 
arguments. On either horn, existence proofs for platonic objects ought not 
to be so easy. Let us step back a bit to see how he arrives at this position.
To Yablo, objects are platonic “relative to an area of discourse due to the 
combination of something positive—the discourse depends for its truth-value 
on how objects like that behave—with something negative—the discourse 
is not about objects of that type.”9 So, relative to the claim, ‘there are as 
many black dogs as red dogs in my house,’ numbers are platonic objects 
because: (a) the truth value of the claim hinges on whether the number that 
numbers the black dogs in my house also numbers the red dogs, and (b) 
the claim concerns my mutts, not some kind of mysterious entities called 
numbers. Now, here is the rub:
(1) There are as many black dogs as red dogs in my house.
(2) There are as many black dogs as red dogs in my house iff the number   
  of black dogs in my house also numbers the red dogs.
(3) Thus, the number of black dogs in my house also numbers the red   
 dogs,  and further, numbers exist!
This argument is valid and apparently sound—we may easily establish 
the truth of (1)10 and we seem to accept the truth of (2) on a priori grounds. But 
if things are as they appear to be, then the proof for the existence of numbers 
becomes unfortunately immediate. Yablo neatly avoids this outcome by 
denying the literal truth of bridge principles like (2). To make his position 
9 Yablo  (2000b: 199).
10 Yablo (2000b: 202) also shows how this difficulty may arise when the first premise 
is an a priori truth. His example: an argument is valid iff it lacks counter models; there 
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plausible, he suggests an alternative to (2) along with a sustained argument 
meant to assuage our reluctance to give up (2).
Yablo notes that one strategy we might use to deny that the proof for 
numbers is trivial is to require an a posteriori justification for (2). If so, then 
the truth of (2) would depend on the ontological status of the platonic objects 
in question. Yablo resists this move, however. He holds, and let us concur, that 
we do not wait for the answers to ontological questions before committing 
ourselves to (2). We simply do not agree that (2) is “‘hanging by a thread’ 
until the empirical situation sorts itself out.”11 Further, the strength of our 
beliefs about bridge principles like (2) does not vary with the strength of 
our beliefs that the relevant platonic objects will be shown to exist through 
empirical investigation. If our justification for (2) were a posteriori, then 
we could not remain so carefree about these matters.12 Presumably, this 
message generalizes to other claims about platonic objects, such as those 
we target in this paper. In particular, we do not care whether or not objects 
like number exist when we endorse claims that quantify over numbers in 
our scientific theories.
Instead, Yablo invokes the idea of quantifiers that are not meant to be 
taken literally to block the easy proof of the existence of numbers—on his 
view we speak metaphorically or figuratively when we say that there is an 
x such that x is a platonic object. He argues that because bridge principles 
employ existential metaphors, “we were never committed in the first place 
to their truth.”13 Thus, we ought to see (2) as a metaphorical claim that 
literally says:
(2*) There are as many black dogs as red dogs in my house iff,   
  supposing that numbers exist, the number of black dogs in my   
  house also numbers the red dogs.
Arguably, (2*) has the virtue that the ontological status of numbers is 
irrelevant to its truth, yet it still does the theoretical work that we require 
from a bridge principle.
To support (2*) as an alternative to (2), Yablo responds to three 
objections from those who believe that the philosophical benefits of accepting 
11 Ibid.: 200.
12 Ibid.: 201–202.
13 Ibid.: 202.93 Quinean Ontological Commitment Derailed
(2) as literally true force us to accept the ontological consequences. First, 
critics argue that if platonic objects offer significant power to clarify our 
discourse that it would otherwise lack, then we ought to embrace these objects 
and not shy away from the associated ontological commitments. Yablo replies 
that increased clarity in our discourse is owed to our conception of platonic 
objects in itself. The existence of platonic objects would add nothing to 
enhance these conceptions as tools of clarification.14
Second, a critic might claim that bridge principles like (2) are necessary 
to metalogical proofs that we cannot do without. As an example, Yablo 
considers a proof that includes a bridge principle that quantifies over models 
which yields the conclusion that if an argument is valid, then any argument 
with the same conclusion and premises will likewise be valid. Yablo counters 
that while it seems that such proofs depend on the truth of the bridge 
principle, instead this feature of valid arguments stems from our notion of 
validity in itself. An argument that employs a bridge principle modified à la 
(2*) can bring this out and, “[o]nce again, we gain as much purchase on the 
content of the concept by aligning it with a condition on assumed objects 
as would be gained by treating the objects as real.”15
Third, and perhaps of most concern, is the claim that if we want our 
discourse to be seen as objective, then we must accept the platonic objects 
it references into our ontology. For, what chance do theories have of being 
objectively true if they refer to nonexistent things? To diffuse this objection, 
Yablo poses a dilemma to those who insist we ought to accept that platonic 
objects exist for the sake of objectivity. Either we have a complete conception 
of the nature of the platonic objects at issue, or we do not. Suppose we do: 
Our conception determines an objective answer as to the truth or falsity 
of a bridge principle like (2*), so we do not a need principle like (2). 
Suppose we do not: We will need to determine the truth or falsity of bridge 
principles like (2) and this will require empirical investigation of the platonic 
objects mentioned, but this takes us back to the untenability of a posteriori 
justifications for such bridge principles discussed above.16
Having offered significant arguments in defense of the claim that we 
basically pretend that platonic objects exist when we say things like (2) and 
14 Ibid.: 203–205.
15 Ibid.: 205–207.
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that instead we literally mean (2*), and furthermore, that claims like (2*) 
will do the work philosophers need from a bridge principle, Yablo (playing 
with a crime metaphor) asks about means—how this subterfuge sneaks in; 
motive—what good the pretense does; and opportunity—why this make-
believe goes unnoticed by philosophers. 
As to means, Yablo argues that some figurative speech is so embedded 
in our language, and so ordinary, that we miss its figurative nature. It is 
easy to see the metaphor when we speak of Italy as a boot. It is less easy to 
catch figures of speech that are “too familiar, insufficiently picturesque, too 
boring,” such as, “[t]hey put a lot of hurdles in your path, there’s a lot that 
could be said about that, there’s no precedent for that, something tells me 
you’re right, there are some things better left unsaid…” Thus, it is reasonable 
to believe that we may similarly overlook the mundane existential metaphors 
that he holds occur with references to platonic objects.17
As to opportunity, first he demonstrates that attending too much to the 
nature of platonic objects leads us away from the subject matter—consider 
above: My subject was red and black dogs, not numbers. Thus, to avoid 
missing the point, we allow platonic objects to remain “unobtrusive.”18 
Second, he argues that the content of some metaphors remains unsettled, and 
that one of the possible contents is the literal content in the case of what he 
calls a “maybe metaphor. For instance, maybe I speak literally maybe I speak 
figuratively when I say that the number of orange fish is two. In such cases, 
the difficulty of seeing the figurative nature our utterances arises because the 
possible literal content obscures the possible metaphorical content.19 I will 
revisit this kind of metaphor again later.
As to motive, Yablo identifies three ways in which metaphors 
may benefit us: They may be representationally essential, cognitively 
advantageous or anticipatorily truthful.20 A metaphor is representationally 
essential if the language of discourse does not allow the content to be 
expressed literally. His example—the literal content of “[t]he average star 
17 Ibid.: 212–214. Also note that over time, Yablo increases his emphasis on his 
figuralism (rather than mere metaphor). See his collection Things 2010, and Turner’s 
(2012) helpful discussion of the evolution of Yablo’s thought in his review of Things.
18 Ibid.: 218–219.
19 Ibid.: 221.
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has 2.4 planets”—is inexpressible in English without the use of platonic 
objects (for instance, the average star or numbers) because the required 
infinite disjunction is an impermissible construction (“[t]here are 12 planets 
and 5 stars or 24 planets and 10 stars or…”).21
A metaphor is cognitively advantageous to Yablo if it allows us to grasp 
the intended content more fully because its presentational force stimulates 
important psychological processes or promotes productive thought due to 
its suggestiveness (re: the average star, “then how many electrons does the 
average atom have?”), or helps us reason by making our thoughts logically 
tractable (the Davidsonian move of going from ‘my red dog barked’ to ‘there 
was a barking done by my red dog’ yields significant logical benefits).22
A metaphor that I have described as anticipatorily truthful is one “in 
which the speaker’s sense of the potential metaphorical truthfulness of a form 
of words outruns her sense of the particular truth(s) being expressed,” and 
may be pregnant, prophetic or patient. 23
Yablo gives ‘the state is an organism’ as an example of a pregnant 
metaphor.24 Notice how, upon continued reflection, the metaphor delivers 
new contents: the interdependency of the parts of a state; the dependence of 
a state’s survival upon what happens in a larger world and so on.
A prophetic metaphor is one whose content is determinate but becomes 
evident only over time: Yablo again—someone tells Macbeth that “none of 
woman born” will harm him. But we, and Macbeth, see the particular truth 
expressed only at the end of the play.25
Yablo offers number talk as an example of a patient metaphor, that is, 
a metaphor whose initial content is open and remains open until and unless 
we find one interpretation to be superior. If we see (2) as a patient metaphor, 
then, depending on how the world turns out to be, the content of (2) might 
be that which it literally expresses or it might be that which (2*) literally 
expresses and (2) metaphorically expresses.26
21 Ibid.: 217.
22 Ibid.: 217–218.
23 Ibid.: 220.
24 Ibid.: 217, footnote 37.
25 Ibid.: 217, footnote 38.
26 Ibid.: 220–22196 Roxanne Marie Kurtz
This sketch illustrates how Yablo seeks to support the position that 
platonic objects may remain useful even if we take them to be objects of 
existential metaphor and to explain how so many philosophers have been 
snookered into taking references to platonic objects literally. Next, Yablo 
strengthens the intuitive plausibility of his position by bringing out several 
properties that some platonic objects have in common with some make-
believe objects. These include paraphrasability (references to either kind 
of object may often be eliminated from the discourse without “felt loss of 
subject matter”), impatience (if someone questions whether the platonic or 
pretend object of which we speak exists, we become impatient), translucency 
(when making sense of claims that reference such an object, the object often 
fails to be part of the content), insubstantiality (any property ascribed to such 
an object generally follows from our conception of it), indeterminacy (the 
identity conditions of such objects may be indeterminate), silliness (questions 
about aspects of such an object that are not answered by what follows from 
our conception of it seem silly), expressiveness (reference to such objects 
may allow us to express things about other entities not otherwise expressible), 
irrelevance (such objects may be used to explain facts that would continue 
to hold in their absence), disconnectedness (usually, we attribute no causal 
power to such objects) and availability (our only access to such objects is 
through our conceptions of them, not through the world).27 To foreshadow, 
I will suggest this list can help us flesh out Azzouni’s criterion of ontological 
commitment.
We now have Yablo’s view, presented, defended and supported. If he is 
right about our extensive use of existential metaphor, then, as he recognizes, 
OC=QC is in trouble. For, the philosopher who wants to use OC=QC 
would first need to strip theories of figurative speech before determining 
her commitments.28 But, it looks as if this may turn out to be an unrealistic 
project, given that the figurative speech in a theory is often pretty much 
invisible, and even when identified it may be near impossible to eliminate 
because of its being representationally essential, cognitively advantageous 
or anticipatorily truthful. Yablo makes this point concisely: “Quine lost the 
debate, in my mind, because he trusted science to drive out the metaphors, 
27 Ibid.: 224–226.
28 Yablo (2000a).97 Quinean Ontological Commitment Derailed
leaving behind the literal truth.  I didn’t see why metaphorical entities 
couldn’t earn a permanent place in our theories.”29
So, we see that Yablo gives us reason to let go of (2). His view also 
offers an explanation as to why it might be reasonable to deny the existence of 
numbers even though our best scientific theories quantify over them: (i) our 
conceptions of numbers serve us equally as well as platonic numbers, and, 
(ii) our continued metaphorical use of numbers is fruitful. Whether or not 
this captures the value of math in science is debatable. Certainly, Azzouni 
and Yablo diverge here. But set that aside. The point I wish to make here 
is that even if we get on board with Yablo at this point, we are left without 
a positive criterion for ontological commitment. It is here that I think 
Azzouni’s thick epistemic access as a criterion of ontological commitment 
meshes especially well with Yablo’s hermeneutic fictionalism. If something 
is not pretend, after all, we should be able to interact with it in the material 
world (or at least understand why it is part of the material world even if we 
cannot do so.) 
3. Azzouni’s untouchable numbers
One of the little tragedies of my early childhood is that I never saw a hobbit;   
and because I did not, I regretfully had to conclude that there were no such things. 
Jody Azzouni30
In “Thick Epistemic Access: Distinguishing the Mathematical from 
the Empirical,”31 Azzouni argues against the Quinean view that a first order 
theory’s quantifier commitments32 are, in themselves, sufficient to establish 
its ontological commitments. Rather, he contends that quantifiers range over 
a theory’s posits, some of which enter the theory because of facts about the 
29 Bateman (2011).
30 Azzouni (1997: 472).
31 Azzouni (1997).
32 In footnote 5, Azzouni (1997), explains his use of ‘quantifier commitment’: “Be 
forewarned: while Quinean doctrines are being denied, I shall not use the term ‘existential 
commitments’ to describe implications of a theory which are in the form of an existential 
quantifier followed by a formula with one free variable; rather, I shall adopt more neutral 
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world and some of which enter the theory because of facts about language. 
Ontological commitment ought to follow from quantifier commitment only 
in the case of some of the former kind of posits—those to which we have 
thick epistemic access. 
Azzouni initially considers observation as he develops the notion of 
thick epistemic access (TEA) to demonstrate the difference between these 
two kinds of posits. Observation via our sensory experiences is a form of 
thick epistemic access in virtue of (at least) four epistemic properties. Fuller 
descriptions will follow, but for now I will give a very concise gloss of 
these. Our observations are robust—they do not hinge (too much) on 
our expectations. They are refinable—we can get a better look at things 
using appropriate strategies. We can use them to monitor and track an 
object’s properties through time. And finally, observations can ground our 
explanations of why we can or cannot know things about what properties 
an object does or does not have.33
Now, it would be hard to deny a theory’s ontological commitment to 
posits to which the theorist, via observation, has thick epistemic access (and 
I will ignore philosophers who would want to); but clearly the ontological 
commitments of many theories go beyond things that we can directly 
observe. This is not a problem for Azzouni, as he asserts that there are 
other forms of thick epistemic access: for one, access to objects through 
the use of instruments. Such instrumental access can possess all the virtues 
of observation enumerated above (although the robustness of instrumental 
access derives from the robustness of observation), thereby delivering 
the possibility of thick epistemic access to unobservable objects such as 
electrons. 
Azzouni contrasts thick epistemic access to thin epistemic access. A posit 
to which we have thin epistemic access is any posit in a theory that has the 
Quinean virtues of “simplicity, familiarity, scope, fecundity, and success 
under testing.” Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment amounts to 
commitment to any posit to which we have thin epistemic access; that is, it 
amounts to quantifier commitment.34 On this view, Azzouni points out, the 
ultimate epistemic ground for claiming that a posit exists is the same for 
33 For three discussions on thick epistemic access, see especially Azzouni (1997:   
474–476; 2004a: 129; 2004b: 383).
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every posit in a theory; thus, to claim that some posits exist while others do 
not would be arbitrary.35 To hold that to be is to be the value of a variable 
is to hold that the values of all variables are on equal footing in terms of 
ontological commitment. 
Azzouni aims to use this distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
access to explain how we might reasonably be ontologically committed 
to electrons but not to mathematical objects. Few would argue against 
the idea that thick epistemic access to an object is sufficient for our being 
ontologically committed to its existence; and clearly, we have no such 
access to things like numbers, so his project looks promising.36 However, 
to go further and claim that thick epistemic access is necessary for our 
being ontologically committed to an object’s existence would be to make 
the mistake of the verificationist. Azzouni carefully avoids this error by 
introducing a defeasability condition: “a theoretical item can be one we 
think exists, even if we do not have appropriate instrumental access to it, 
provided that we can tell a decent story, in terms of its properties, about 
why we cannot have such instrumental access to it.”37 (Azzouni calls these 
defeasibility stories.) So, although we have no thick epistemic access to the 
Higgs boson,38 it is not untenable to assert its existence because, first, we 
can explain our lack of thick epistemic access and, second, we have other 
good reasons to think such particles exist. We might now, as a first stab, 
say that the following is Azzouni’s criterion for ontological commitment:
tea: Thick epistemic access is sufficient for ontological commitment. 
Further, we may maintain the existence of any posit that we believe has 
properties that let us tell a defeasability story about why we cannot gain 
thick epistemic access to it.
But this is too easy. As Azzouni himself recognizes, in terms of 
ontological commitment, TEA once again puts mathematical objects on 
equal footing in terms of ontological commitment with the Higgs boson, 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.: 480.
38 Let us pretend this is before CERN’s recent announcement concerning the Higgs 
boson and we do not yet have instrumental access to it. We can always substitute any 
scientific posit to which we lack thick epistemic access but still hope to find it.100 Roxanne Marie Kurtz
though not atoms—that is, with any posit to which we currently fail to 
have thick epistemic access. After all, we do have a defeasability story: 
mathematical objects exist outside of space and time, thus, of course we 
have no route to thick epistemic access of them.39Azzouni responds to 
this difficulty by arguing that we ought not to take such a defeasability 
story seriously because, “one already understands that, of course, they 
[mathematical objects] are not the sorts of things one would even want to 
get in instrumental or observational contact with.”40 Thus, we need to recast 
TEA as:
TEA*: Thick epistemic access is sufficient for ontological commitment. 
Further, we may maintain the existence of any posit that we believe has 
properties such that we ought to tell a defeasability story about why we 
cannot gain thick epistemic access to it.
For this response to be anything but ad hoc, Azzouni must provide 
a criterion for when we ought to tell a defeasability story and when we 
ought not. This he does in the final section of his paper by separating posits 
that enter our theories because of how the material world is from those that 
enter because of how our language works. He uses the oft-cited example of 
numbers to suggest how it could be the case that all mathematical objects 
are of the latter type (though even if we accept this example, he does not 
suggest that this serves as a proof for such a claim). For any upper limit on 
the number of Fs and Gs, first order logic can express that the number of Fs 
is the number of Gs without quantifying over numbers—suppose, at most, 
there are two Fs and Gs, then we may say: 
{¬∃xFx∧¬∃xGx}∨{∃x[Fx∧∀z(Fz→z=x)]∧∃x[Gx∧∀z(Gz→z=x)]} 
∨{∃x∃y[Fx∧Fy∧x≠y∧∀z(Fz→(z=x∨z=y))]∧∃x∃y[Gx∧Gy∧x≠y∧∀z
(Gz→(z=x∨z=y))]}
However, because of the inexpressibility of infinite disjunctions in 
first order logic, we cannot say that the number of Fs is the number of Gs 
without establishing an upper limit first. This linguistic limitation forces 
39 Azzouni (1997: 480).
40 Ibid.101 Quinean Ontological Commitment Derailed
our use of numbers in many first order theories.41 Azzouni’s point is that in 
such cases, “we are not implicitly using an inference to the best explanation, 
hypothetical-deductive methods, or any other traditional scientific method 
for establishing the existence of something.”42 Thus we get the basis for the 
normative claim that Azzouni needs: If something is a posit merely because 
the limitations of language force it into our theory, then we ought not try to 
tell a defeasability story about it. 
4. Why team up to derail the Quinean train? 
As discussed early on, Azzouni and Yablo sharply disagree on some key 
questions regarding mathematical objects, especially with respect to the 
truth conditions of mathematical claims when we take them literally and 
the facts about the existence of mathematical objects. Nevertheless, I hope 
my discussion thus far has suggested to the reader that we may still find 
reasons informed by and consistent across both positions to pursue our 
tasks of rejecting OC=QC and exploring a possible alternative criterion. 
Letting the theories inform each other seems particularly productive because 
(in some sense) they are two sides of the same coin. I think it is fair to say 
in terms of ontological carving work, Azzouni’s approach focuses on the 
distinctiveness of concrete objects while Yablo’s approach focuses on special 
features of platonic objects.
5. OC=QC: Off-track
One reason we can combine views to call OC=QC into question is the 
congeniality of Azzouni’s view to Yablo’s idea of mathematical objects as 
metaphorical objects essential to the expressive power of language. We see 
this quite clearly when Azzouni writes that we quantify over mathematical 
objects because “the language we use to describe things has to be formulated 
41 Azzouni gives an interesting second example from geometry, which I will not rehearse 
here.
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a certain way if we want greater facility to manipulate descriptions of objects 
and recognize similarities among them…”43
The important move that Yablo and Azzouni share is to separate 
quantifier commitment from ontological commitment because we ought 
not to treat all quantifiers alike. Azzouni argues that if some posits are 
indispensable because of how language is rather than how the world is, then 
we ought not to be ontologically committed to them, regardless of our use 
of quantifiers. Yablo explains more fully why we may permissibly fail to 
follow quantifiers blindly to our ontological commitments by bringing out 
that the quantifiers in claims that enter theories because of language alone are 
metaphorical and can be representationally essential. Further, he smoothes 
the way a bit for our acceptance of the failure of oC=QC with a discussion 
of how such posits enter language, how they remain in use regardless of 
our attempts to remove them from scientific theories and why we might not 
want to remove them in any case. 
Further, if we read Azzouni in a way that allows some quantifiers to 
be metaphors, then Yablo’s fuller account of the benefits of using existential 
metaphors in our theories adds depth to the notion of a posit entering theory 
for reasons of language alone. For instance, Yablonian considerations of 
the value of cognitively advantageous or anticipatorily truthful metaphors 
ought to strike scientists as very appealing when designing a fruitful theory 
(though it may leave some questions unanswered when patient metaphors 
are used). Permitting such existential metaphors into a theory may make 
the ideas within the theory more easily and fully communicated and their 
logical connections better understood, encourage ongoing creative thinking, 
allow work to progress until relevant facts become evident, allow work to 
progress without regard to the truth or falsity of claims irrelevant to the 
subject matter, and allow work to progress toward “something right” before 
all the details are known. 
Recognizing the diverse benefits of existential metaphors brings out 
how useful they may be in trying to make a theory simple, familiar, of useful 
scope, fecund and successful under testing (to borrow from Quine). And this 
fact can help someone who likes Azzouni’s approach (even rejecting his 
formalism) explain why we fail to have thick epistemic access to far more 
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posits mentioned in important bits of critical theories than those that can 
be explained away by reference to purely representational concerns alone. 
Then, Azzouni delivers a final blow by providing a suitable alternative 
to oC=QC that does not make us look at a theory’s claims and divide them 
into two piles—one of literal claims and one of figurative claims—and 
then reformulate the theory without using claims in the second pile before 
deciding what there is. This is especially important given Yablo’s position 
that we might simply never be able to eliminate figurative claims from our 
best scientific theories. And why should we strive to, given their utility 
and fruitfulness, once we have other means of arriving at our ontological 
commitments?
A Quinean defender might want to argue that Azzouni’s criterion could 
serve as a way to distinguish metaphorical from non-metaphorical claims 
and that Quine could revise his criterion to limit ontological commitment 
to posits mentioned in our best theory’s non-metaphorical claims. But this 
seems to distort Quine’s intentions too much. Using Azzouni’s criterion in 
such a way would mean that the revised Quinean criterion would require 
us to look at the world with one eye and study our theory with the other, to 
say what there is. Further, even if it were an acceptable distortion, it would 
amount to Azzouni’s criterion with a Quinean brand.
6.  Contrasting Silly Access to Platonic Objects Thick Epistemic 
Access 
Some philosophers who otherwise might be moved by Yablo’s arguments 
may resist coming fully to his side because it would seem to leave them 
without a viable theory of ontological commitment—given the stubborn 
difficulties we face in isolating literal claims from metaphorical claims. Not 
only does Azzouni’s criterion fill this void, it cleanly avoids the problems 
for Yablo’s view that Quine’s view creates. In separating quantifier 
commitment from ontological commitment, metaphorical existential claims 
become ontologically unproblematic. On Azzouni’s view we look not to the 
quantifiers, but to our access to things in the world, to decide our ontological 
commitments. And this seems fair enough. 
Indeed, it appears probable that philosophers have misread the 
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to be investigated—the smuggling of metaphorical claims into our 
theories. Scientists, or normal people anyway, may never have wanted to 
believe that all things we need to quantify over exist. To repeat an earlier 
point, TEA* goes a long way toward making this claim tenable because it 
offers a principled way to identify the kind of posits that Yablo calls platonic 
objects. And it does so without a reliance on our intuitions about the roles of 
various bits of language or on our creativity (or lack thereof) to find solutions 
that dispense with them. 
Moreover, if we carry our Yablonian intuitions over to our musings 
on TEA*, we might uncover more features of thick epistemic access or 
better understand some of those already put on the table by Azzouni. I try 
to capture some of the possible back-and-forth in the table below. The table 
offers a fuller description of Azzouni’s four features of observation, in virtue 
of which it counts as a form of thick epistemic access, along with some 
connections to Yablo. Beyond the four features already discussed, I have 
expanded the list. Yablo’s discussion of the similarities between platonic 
objects (which I take to be the same thing as the posits of a theory to which 
we fail to have thick epistemic access) and make-believe objects suggests 
properties of observation that look to be additional properties in virtue of 
which observation is a form of thick epistemic access because of opposites 
(though I do not mean to suggest that either Azzouni or Yablo would go 
along with all of these indicators of TEA*).
To motivate the idea that Revealingness is an important property of 
observation in virtue of which we gain thick epistemic access to the things 
observed, contrast our observation of the activities of some members of 
a species that reveals new things about the species with our study of numbers 
from which “[a]ll the really important facts … follow from (2nd order) Peano’s 
Axioms.”44  In the latter case, anything we learn about numbers follows from 
our concepts of them. The point here is that if a theory mentions a posit 
for reasons of language alone, then discoveries about that posit should not 
extend beyond those implied by our concept of what the posit would be like. 
With respect to Contingency on Existence, this merely highlights that our 
observations of non-platonic objects stop if they cease to exist, in contrast 
to platonic objects.
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Indicator of Thick Epistemic 
Access
Azzouni Yablo
Robustness: although some of 
our observations are mistaken, 
affected by training or under-
stood only if given some theory, 
in the main, our observations 
are robust across most circum-
stances and “largely independ-
ent (epistemically speaking) of 
what the recipient(s) expect” to 
observe (Azzouni 2004a: 129).
Original component of Azzou-
ni’s thick epistemic access. For 
three formulations, see espe-
cially Azzouni (1997: 474–476; 
2004a: 129; 2004b: 383).
Yablo helps us contrast the 
robustness of observation with 
our beliefs about things like 
numbers which are only con-
ceptually available to us. Our 
observations of mathematical 
objects are robust only in the 
trivial sense that they remain 
steady in their absence.
Refinability: we can refine and 
adjust our observations—for 
instance, by moving closer to 
an object—to help us distin-
guish between a thing’s true 
properties and properties it may 
merely seem to have because of 
perceptual error.
Original component of Azzou-
ni’s thick epistemic access. For 
three formulations, see espe-
cially Azzouni (1997: 474–476; 
2004a: 129; 2004b: 383).
Perhaps it is because of the 
translucency and insubstantial-
ity of platonic objects that we 
have no chance to refine our 
observations of them.
Monitoring: our observations 
over time allow us to learn 
about various properties of an 
object and to track changes in 
an object’s properties over time.
Original component of Azzou-
ni’s thick epistemic access. For 
three formulations, see espe-
cially Azzouni (1997: 474–476; 
2004a: 129; 2004b: 383).
Here the problems of monitor-
ing platonic objects are evident, 
but below I suggest some Yab-
lo-inspired indicators of TEA* 
that are either part of Azzouni’s 
monitoring or related to it.
Grounding: we can use ob-
served properties of a thing 
to explain how we can know 
(or fail to know) about those 
or other of its properties—we 
can see books because they are 
solid, opaque objects.
Original component of Azzou-
ni’s thick epistemic access. For 
three formulations, see espe-
cially Azzouni (1997: 474–476; 
2004a: 129; 2004b: 383).
Notice that this indicator helps 
the significance of Yablo’s point 
that platonic objects are like 
pretend objects in that they are 
only conceptually available to 
us. As such, we could not use 
observed properties of num-
bers, for instance, to explain our 
knowledge of their properties. 
Revealingness: observation 
reveals theoretically significant 
properties of the object studied 
over and above those that our 
conception of them already 
entails.
In correspondence, Azzouni 
shared with me that he intends 
his tracking indicator to cap-
ture. Fair enough. I have tried 
to capture this in “Monitoring” 
above. This also may be part 
of “Robustness.” Still, I keep 
Revealingness separate here to 
show how Yablo’s discussion 
emphasizes the importance of 
this aspect of the indicator.
Yablo’s discussion of both the 
insubstantiality of platonic ob-
jects and the silliness of ques-
tions that go beyond those 
answered by our conceptions of 
them highlight the importance 
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Contingency on existence: 
some of our observations 
change upon destruction of 
the object.
Plausibly, Azzouni would al-
ready count this as part of his 
tracking indicator. 
Yablo’s discussion of the ir-
relevance of platonic objects to 
science motivates this indicator 
— nothing in our observations 
will change if the number nine 
self-destructs. His point on 
the impatience we experience 
when asked about the existence 
of platonic objects is likewise 
suggestive for the same reason. 
Finally, his concern about the 
disconnectedness of platonic 
objects supports this as an in-
dicator.
Language resistance: the 
value of information gleaned 
through observation is lan-
guage resistant. It remains 
relevant to a theory’s success 
no matter how one rephrases 
or paraphrases its hypotheses, 
so long as the subject matter 
does not change. Moreover, 
the information would remain 
relevant even if the expressive 
powers of our language were to 
change significantly.
This suits Azzouni’s view that 
we ought not to take quantifiers 
that enter our theories for rea-
sons of language alone serious-
ly, though in correspondence he 
notes that such a suggestion is 
quite controversial.
Inspired by Yablo on the para-
phrasability of apparent ref-
erences to platonic objects 
without a “felt loss of subject 
matter,” along with the trans-
lucency of platonic objects 
and, finally, the bonus in terms 
of expressiveness delivered by 
platonic objects.
Identity Establishing: usu-
ally, we can use observation 
to distinguish one thing from 
another thing, one token from 
another token. Further, when 
we cannot, it is not silly to ask 
why not.
Again, this indicator is congen-
ial to Azzouni’s view; perhaps 
we might understand it as part 
of the explanation of epistemic 
access.
Inspired by Yablo on the inde-
terminacy of platonic objects 
and the silliness of questions 
about them.
Yablo also tells us that we can paraphrase away talk of platonic objects 
in our scientific theories without feeling as though we have lost information. 
In contrast, we cannot likewise “disappear” the importance of observational 
data to science. This is what motivated Language Resistance. To see how the 
fact that the importance of observation reports is language resistant plays 
a role in having thick epistemic access to observed objects, let us again 
compare two cases. First, consider the relevance to the theory of zoology 
of any observed behavior of creatures that we call Donzos and classify as 
belonging to a certain genus, class, etc. The relevance of such observations 
to zoology remains constant, no matter how we try to paraphrase or rephrase 
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they were false in virtue of the fact that we were wrong about the genus of 
Donzos). But now consider the relevance of proving certain mathematical 
claims to zoology (I assume some mathematical theory enters zoology). 
If we succeed in rephrasing, paraphrasing, or eliminating any mathematical 
claim in zoological theory, then that claim and whatever proof the claim 
depended upon become irrelevant to zoology. Observation allows us contact 
with the things that our theory is about. This explains why our observation 
reports remain pertinent to our theories no matter how we use language to 
spell them out.
Also in contrast with the indeterminate identity conditions of platonic 
objects and the perceived silliness of questions about platonic objects that 
are not answered by what follows from our conceptions, Yablo’s view 
suggests that when we instead have thick epistemic access to an object, our 
observations should help us answer non-silly questions about identity: they 
should be Identity Establishing. Again, to see the import of this property of 
observation to the idea of thick epistemic access, let us see what difference it 
makes. Notice that we can establish that one frog is not another frog through 
observation, or, if observation fails to enlighten us, we can, at a minimum, 
explain what barriers to establishing identity would need to be removed. 
However, our access to numbers is not at all like this. Observation will 
never establish whether or not the Fregean number 7 is identical with the 
Zermelo number 7, or even if the number two that numbers my dogs is the 
same number two that numbers my feet. 
I expect that Yablo’s discussion could suggest more properties of 
observation than I have managed to think of that Azzouni might want to 
consider. But let us now turn to seeing if our fortified list of properties in 
virtue of which observation is a form of thick epistemic access helps either 
philosopher respond to critics of his position.
7. Replying to naysayers
Let us now consider how we may better address critics of both Yablo and 
Azzouni if we are willing to intertwine some aspects of their views. At the 
end of his article, Azzouni cautions us against taking his argument as one 
that purports to show that there are no mathematical objects; his argument 
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itself, does not entail ontological commitment. In footnote 17, his claim 
becomes even more tentative:
I am writing as if I have given an argument for this position, but perhaps 
I am only shifting burdens. What response is there to someone who 
argues, “You have to say, ‘there is the same number of cats as dogs’, 
and that is enough of a reason by itself to think that item (the number) 
exists. Who cares about whether this posit got into the theory ‘the wrong 
way’; the point is that we cannot get it out again.” What can anyone 
say to this?45
However, the neo-Yabounnian may well have a response to the footnote 
naysayer. What can anyone say? We can explain why we cannot get it out 
again by appeals to the indispensability of metaphor to our scientific theories 
as motivated by Yablo.
The OC=QC Loyalist
If the challenge is that if one accepts a theory, then he ought to believe in 
what it says there is, then it sounds as if the critic is holding tenaciously to 
OC=QC. However, as we saw above, Azzouni’s champion who embraces 
Yablo’s view is well positioned to reject this argument. Once the two views 
are combined, she has a reasonable alternative to OC=QC to offer the 
critic that better answers questions concerning what roles claims about 
pretend posits do in our best theories—we may use them in virtue of their 
representational, cognitive or truth-conveying advantages. Since we may 
obtain these advantages through existential metaphor without postulating 
the existence of these objects, then it makes sense to change our criterion 
of ontological commitment to that of Azzouni to avoid either sacrificing the 
utility of our theories or making unnecessary assumptions. This strikes me 
as a fairly significant something to say.
Further, our new properties of observation that we have identified as 
important to thick epistemic access may also be invoked to bring out aspects 
of the purported objects that the critic might not have previously considered. 
He will see that he must be willing to admit to the existence of objects such 
that: all he will ever know about them follows from what we know about our 
concepts of them; his affirmation of their existence will quickly change to 
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denial if some way is found to eliminate mention of them; and the identity 
of the objects will remain, despite our best efforts, uncomfortably vague. 
At this point it seems that for his view to remain plausible, the critic needs 
to do more than reiterate the indispensability argument. 
Mr. Serious
Alternatively, the challenge might be to rebut Mr. Serious who claims that 
given the high assertibility of claims about pretend posits in the middle of 
our best theories, they must be true.46 It still seems as though scientists might 
still be going around saying things they do not mean all time. Mr. Serious 
demands to know how they could ever be justified in doing this.
Here, Azzouni’s defender could appeal to Yablo’s idea of existential 
metaphor together with the idea of apt metaphors. Yablo writes that a make-
believe game:
is apt relative to such and such a subject matter to the extent that 
it lends itself to the expression of truths about that subject matter. 
A particular metaphorical utterance is apt to the extent that (a) it is 
a move in an apt game, and (b) it makes impressive use of the resources 
that game provides. [Yablo: class notes, lecture on “Mathematics as 
Gameskeeping,” p. 17]
So, for instance, the game of mathematics is particularly apt relative to 
physics. On this view, we say that scientists are playing make-believe when 
they make claims that refer to pretend posits, but they justifiably engage in 
this activity because all the non-metaphorical implicatures of apt metaphors 
are literally true. It is in virtue of this fact that the claims involving existential 
metaphors become assertible, and, indeed, why they seem so darn true to us. 
Consider the sentence, ‘Blue combined with yellow makes green.’ Here, 
blue, yellow and green appear to be entities (‘Flour combined with water 
makes paste’), rather than properties. Assuming properties do not exist, we 
can see this as a case of existential metaphor. The literally true implicatures 
that follow from this metaphor are sentences like, ‘Blue paint combined with 
yellow paint makes green paint,’ or, ‘When one looks through two lenses, 
one yellow and one blue, things will look green.’ These implicatures are 
46 Yablo at one point suggested something like this, as well as the question about the 
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literally true, as are a whole bundle of implicatures we implicitly understand 
follow from the metaphor, and this makes us very inclined to ascribe truth 
to the metaphor because it leads us to these truths.
So, the quick answer to Mr. Serious is that scientists may justifiably 
assert existential metaphors when their non-metaphorical implicatures turn 
out to be literally true.
Mathsense of a Philosopher-Mathematician
Finally, let us consider a problem facing Yablo that is also better addressed 
by the combined view. A philosopher-mathematician might accept Azzouni’s 
alternative criterion for ontological commitment, but argue that she has thick 
epistemic access to numbers via some form of mathematical perception or 
intuition—call it mathsense. Such a person could remain committed to the 
literal truth of mathematical statements, even in light of Yablo’s arguments, 
because Yablo undermines only the a priori and Quinean arguments for the 
existence of numbers. 
Now, on the one hand, that we could conclusively prove that such 
a person lacks mathsense seems as unlikely as the possibility that we could 
prove that a Pope cannot hear God. On the other hand, our extended list of 
properties of observation that make it a form of thick epistemic access may 
cause some believers in mathsense to question themselves. 
Our philosopher-mathematician already says she has thick epistemic 
access to numbers. To be consistent, then, she would have to argue 
that mathematical observation via mathsense counts as a form of thick 
epistemic access. But it seems she could do this using our indicators of 
thick epistemic access. Without blaringly obvious difficulties, she could 
argue that mathematical observation via her mathsense is robust across most 
circumstances and refinable through mathematical training. Further, she 
could claim that she could use her it to monitor the properties of mathematical 
objects over time (though, given the eternal nature of numbers, changes 
would likely be limited to relations to physical objects), and use it to ground 
her explanation of why we cannot observe mathematical objects through the 
other modes of perception—just like we can only taste flavors, hear sound 
and see light, we can only mathsense mathematical objects.
However, I think that she will find it more difficult to hold that 
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that we appended. Through regular observation, we can discover properties of 
things that we could never have deduced that they would possess. However, 
the philosopher-mathematician with mathsense does not discover any 
properties of numbers that the less fortunate mathsense-blind individual 
could not have discovered through deduction. She will also be hard-pressed 
to explain why her mathematical observations that were essential to the 
development of a theory remain relevant to that theory even if paraphrased 
away later. Finally, she would need to tell us why her mathsense does not 
allow her to see which numbers are identical. Thus, our mathematician 
will face more troubles trying to endow mathematical observation with the 
expanded list of thick epistemic access indicators.
In light of our enriched notion of the nature of thick epistemic access, 
our philosopher-mathematician might finally concede that her access to 
numbers is lacking—perhaps even that it amounts to unusual familiarity 
and facility with mathematical concepts, and that it is her skill that makes it 
clear to her what properties objects standing behind mathematical concepts 
would have to have, if they existed. 
***
I end here without a neat conclusion to bring these bits and pieces of 
discussion on the fit of Yablo’s story about our metaphorical talk of numbers 
(and such) and Azzouni’s tale of what we should believe exists if we believe 
science. I can only reiterate the point I have made over and over: a joined 
view deserves serious consideration.47
It remains to be asked: How shall we join the views to yield the most 
defensible metaphysics? We may not merely sew them together as they 
include inconsistent metaphysical commitments. Should we import parts 
of Azzouni’s machinery into Yablo’s position when it is possible to do so 
without distorting Yablo’s view, or vice versa? Ought we to draw from both 
47 Thanks to Stephen Yablo and Jody Azzouni for helpful comments on a previous draft 
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positions to arrive at a third alternative not yet considered? I will be happy 
to have shown these questions are worth asking.48
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